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Abstract
We compare welfare and prots under price and quantity competition in mixed duopolies, wherein
a state-owned public rm competes against a private rm. It has been shown that price competi-
tion yields larger prot for the private rm and greater welfare if the two rms move simultaneously,
regardless of whether the private rm is domestic or foreign. We investigate welfare and prot rank-
ings under Stackelberg competition. Under public leadership, the prot and welfare rankings have
common features with the simultaneous-move game, regardless of the nationality of private rms. By
contrast, under private leadership, the result depends on the nationality of the private rm. When
the private rm is domestic, welfare is greater under quantity competition, while the result is reversed
when the private rm is foreign. However, regardless of nationality, private rms earn more under
price competition. Introducing the nonnegative prot constraint in the public rm improves welfare
and increases the private rm's prot, and price competition yields a higher prot for private rms
regardless of nationality and which rm is the leader. However, this constraint aects the welfare
ranking. Under private leadership, quantity competition yields greater welfare regardless of the na-
tionality of the private rm. These results indicate that prot ranking is fairly robust to the time
structure in mixed Stackelberg duopolies, but welfare ranking is not.
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1 Introduction
The literature contains extensive comparisons between price and quantity competition. In oligopolies of
private rms, price competition is stronger, yielding lower prots and greater welfare than in the case
of quantity competition.1 Ghosh and Mitra (2010) revisited the comparison between price and quantity
competition in a mixed duopoly in which a welfare-maximizing public rm competes against a prot-
maximizing private rm.2 They showed that price competition yields larger prot for the private rm
and greater welfare than quantity competition. In other words, welfare ranking is common with private
duopolies but prot ranking is the opposite.
The literature on Cournot{Bertrand comparison in mixed oligopolies has become rich and diverse
recently. Haraguchi and Matsumura (2014) showed that Ghosh and Mitra's (2010) result holds, re-
gardless of the nationality of the private rm. Scrimitore (2014) adopted Matsumura's (1998) partial
privatization approach and considered the optimal degree of privatization. Her ndings showed that
under optimal privatization policies, Cournot competition could yield higher prots for private rms
than under Bertrand competition. The optimal degree of privatization is lower under Bertrand compe-
tition, and a lower degree of privatization leads to stronger competition. Here, the prot ranking can
be reversed under optimal privatization policies, while welfare ranking is not (Bertrand yields greater
welfare). Haraguchi and Matsumura (2016) investigated an oligopoly model and showed that the prot-
ranking can be reverted if the number of private rms is large, whereas the welfare-ranking is not.
Ghosh and Mitra (2014) discussed a case in which both rms are concerned with welfare and showed
that Cournot competition could yield higher prots for the rms than under Bertrand competition. The
aforementioned studies, however, assumed that rms play simultaneous-move games.
1See Shubik and Levitan (1980) and Vives (1985). Introducing some externality eects can undoubtedly reverse the
welfare ranking. For example, if we introduce a negative externality associated with production, a lower output level under
quantity competition can yield greater welfare. In this study, we completely neglect this type of technological externality.
2Most countries have state-owned public rms with substantial inuence on their market competitors. Such mixed
oligopolies occur in various industries, such as airlines, steel, automobile, railway, natural gas, electricity, postal services,
education, hospital, home loan, and banking. Analyses of mixed oligopolies date back to Merrill and Schneider (1966).
Their study and many others in the eld assume that a public rm maximizes welfare (consumer surplus plus rm prots),
while private rms maximize prots. For examples of mixed oligopolies and recent developments in research in this eld,
see Ishida and Matsushima (2009), Tomaru and Kiyono (2010), and Cato and Matsumura (2012).
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Another strand of the literature related to this study is on Stackelberg mixed oligopolies. The liter-
ature on mixed oligopolies contains intense discussions of both public leadership and private leadership
models.3 Wang and Mukherjee (2012) and Wang and Lee (2013) considered public leadership in a ho-
mogeneous product market and showed that the public leadership benets total social surplus but is less
benecial for consumer welfare than public monopoly.4 Gelves and Heywood (2013) found that mergers
of public and private rms can improve welfare under public leadership. Pal (1998) showed that welfare
is greater in the private leadership game than in the public leadership and simultaneous-move games, and
Ino and Matsumura (2010) showed it in a free-entry market. Poyago-Theotoky (2001) and Myles (2002)
showed that White's (1996) privatization neutrality theorem holds under public leadership, and Tomaru
and Saito (2010) showed it under private leadership. Matsumura and Okumura (2015, 2017) illustrated
the same under two sequential move games by output-oor regulation in non-free-entry markets and
free-entry markets. However, all of these studies assumed quantity competition and did not discuss the
price{quantity comparison.
In this study, we consider two sequential-move games, public leadership and private leadership games,
and revisit the price{quantity comparison in mixed duopolies. In private duopolies with sequential move,
Boyer and Moreaux (1987) showed that quantity competition is more protable and price competition
provides higher total welfare, whatever the role (leader, follower). Thus, we can naturally suppose that in
mixed duopolies, the two sequential-move games also provide the same welfare and prot ranking. This
supposition is, however, not correct. The two sequential-move games provide the same prot ranking
3Both public leadership and private leadership models are important for analyzing Japanese nancial markets, which are
typical examples of mixed oligopolies. Until the 1980s, public enterprises played a leading role in the Japanese economy. It
was believed that lending by public nancial institutions (e.g., the Development Bank of Japan) had a pump-priming eect
on private bank lending. Furthermore, public nancing occupied an important position in Japanese nancial markets for
over 40 years (Horiuchi and Sui, 1993). The Koizumi Cabinet (April 2001{September 2006) changed this by declaring that
public rms should play a complementary role to private rms, with the latter leading the markets rather than the former.
Consequently, major public institutions were substantially downscaled. This situation can be described by the private
leadership model (Ino and Matsumura, 2010, Matsumura and Ogawa, 2017). However, public institutions recently begun
to lead Japanese markets once more. Newly established public nancial institutions such as the Industrial Revitalization
Corporation of Japan, the Enterprise Turnaround Initiative Corporation of Japan, and the Regional Economy Vitalization
Corporation of Japan play leading roles in nancial markets (Matsumura and Ogawa, 2017). The public leadership model
is also a useful means to investigate this situation.
4They established another great contribution by showing that each private rm's prot can be increasing with the
number of private rms in their mixed oligopolies. For this discussion, see also Matsumura and Sunada (2013).
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as the simultaneous-move game, but the private leadership game yields a dierent welfare ranking from
that of the simultaneous-move and public leadership games.
First, we analyze a model in which the private (public) rm is the leader (follower). In the context
of mixed oligopolies, the public rm's acceptance of the follower role often improves welfare (Pal, 1998;
Matsumura, 2003a; Ino and Matsumura, 2010; Matsumura and Ogawa, 2017). Many stated that the
public rm should play a complementary role to private rms, and the role of follower is adequate from
this viewpoint. In this study, we show that when the public rm is the follower, quantity competition
is stronger than price competition, resulting in a smaller prot for the private rm. This result is in
accordance with that in the simultaneous-move game. However, the welfare ranking can be reversed.
When the private rm is domestic (foreign), quantity (price) competition yields greater welfare than price
(quantity) competition. In other words, the welfare ranking is crucially dependent on the nationality of
the private rm.5
Next, we analyze a model in which the public (private) rm is the leader (follower). We nd the
same prot and welfare rankings as in the simultaneous-move game, that is, price competition yields
higher prot for the private rm and greater welfare, regardless of the nationality of the private rm.
We then introduce the nonnegative prot constraint for the public rm. The literature on mixed
oligopolies shows that the public rm's welfare-maximizing behavior may yield negative prots for the
public rm.6 However, as Estrin and de Meza (1995), Ishida and Matsushima (2009), and Wang and
Tomaru (2015) discussed, we often observe that the nonnegative prot constraint is imposed on public
rms. We nd that the welfare and prot ranking remains unchanged under public leadership. By
contrast, under private leadership, the nonnegative prot constraint aects the welfare ranking. This
constraint improves welfare with quantity competition, while welfare remains unchanged with price
competition. As a result, quantity competition more likely yields greater welfare than price competition.
5The nationality of private rms is often crucial in shaping mixed oligopolies; refer to the literature starting with Corneo
and Jeanne (1994) and Fjell and Pal (1996). For recent developments in this eld, refer to Barcena-Ruiz and Garzon
(2005a,b), Han and Ogawa (2008), Lin and Matsumura (2012), and Cato and Matsumura (2015).
6See the studies mentioned in footnote 5.
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Finally, we discuss the endogenous competition structure (endogenous price-quantity choice) as dis-
cussed by Singh and Vives (1984). They formulated a two-stage game. In the rst stage, each rm
simultaneously chooses a price or quantity contract. In the second stage, after observing the rival's
choice in the rst stage, each rm simultaneously chooses price or quantity according to the rst stage
choice. They investigated a private duopoly and showed that both rms choose the quantity contract.
Cournot competition therefore appears in equilibrium. Matsumura and Ogawa (2012) investigated this
endogenous competition structure in a mixed duopoly and showed that both rms choose the price
contract. Bertrand competition therefore appears in equilibrium.7
We investigate this problem in public and private leadership games.8 We consider two time lines: one
where two rms simultaneously choose a price or quantity contract before facing Stackelberg competition,
and the other in which the leader chooses between price or quantity rst, before the follower chooses after
observing the leader's price or quantity. We nd that in both timelines, under both public and private
leadership, price competition appears in equilibrium, regardless of whether quantity or price competition
yields greater welfare. This indicates that equilibrium competition structure can be inecient under
private leadership.
2 Model
We adopt a standard duopoly model with dierentiated goods and linear demand (Dixit, 1979).9 The
quasi-linear utility function of the representative consumer is
U(q0; q1; y) = (q0 + q1)  
2
(q20 + 2q0q1 + q
2
1) + y; (1)
7However, not all studies on mixed oligopolies support this result. Chirco and Scrimitore (2013), Chirco et al. (2014),
Scrimitore (2013), and Haraguchi and Matsumura (2016) suggested that price competition may fail to be an equilibrium
outcome.
8Because our primary aim is to revisit price{quantity comparisons in Stackelberg mixed duopolies, we do not endogenize
the timing of their action. Although many papers discussed endogenous timing in mixed oligopolies, endogenizing the
timing is out of scope of this study. Pal (1998) began the discussion of endogenous timing in mixed oligopolies. Many
papers, such as those by Matsumura (2003a), Capuano and De Feo (2010), and Matsumura and Ogawa (2010) showed that
private leadership is more likely to appear in mixed oligopolies. However, Matsumura (2003b) and Matsumura and Ogawa
(2017) showed examples in which public leadership is more likely to appear in equilibrium.
9This demand function is popular in the literature on mixed oligopolies. Refer to Barcena-Ruiz (2007), Ishida and
Matsushima (2009), and Matsumura and Shimizu (2010).
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where q0 is the consumption of good 0 produced by the public rm, q1 is the consumption of good
1 produced by the private rm, and y is the consumption of an outside good provided competitively
(with a unitary price). Parameters  and  are positive constants and  2 (0; 1) represents the degree
of product dierentiation, where a smaller  indicates a larger degree of product dierentiation. The
inverse demand functions for goods i = 0; 1 with i 6= j are
pi =   qi   qj ; (2)
where pi is the price of rm i.
The marginal cost of production is constant for both rms. We denote the marginal cost of rm i
with ci, assuming  > c0  c1. In addition, we assume that  is suciently large and that c0  c1 is not
too large to assure interior solutions in the following games. Firm 0 is a state-owned public rm whose
payo is the domestic social surplus (welfare). This is given by
SW = (p0   c0)q0 + (1  )(p1   c1)q1 +

(q0 + q1)  (q
2
0 + 2q0q1 + q
2
1)
2
  p0q0   p1q1

; (3)
where  2 [0; 1] is the ownership share of foreign investors in rm 1, which is potentially aected by
policymakers acting on capital liberalization. Firm 1 is a private rm and its payo is its own prot:
1 = (p1   c1)q1: (4)
3 Private leadership: Public rm as the Stackelberg follower
In this section, we analyze a model in which rm 0 (1) is the follower (leader). First, we discuss quantity
competition. Firm 1 chooses its quantities and then rm 0 moves after observing q1. The rst-order
condition for rm 0 is10
@SW
@q0
=   c0   (q0 + (1  )q1) = 0: (5)
From (5), we obtain the following reaction function for rm 0:
R0(q1) =
  c0   (1  )q1

: (6)
10All of the second-order conditions in this study are satised.
6
Firm 1 maximizes its prot, 1(q1; R0(q1)), with respect to q1. The rst-order condition for rm 1 is
  c1   (  c0)  2(1  (1  )2)q1 = 0: (7)
Let the superscript \FQ" denote the equilibrium outcome of this game, where \F" means public
followership (private leadership) and \Q" means quantity competition. From (7), we obtain
qFQ1 =
(  c1)  (  c0)
2(1  (1  )2) : (8)
Substituting it into (6), we obtain
qFQ0 =
(  c0)(2  (1  )2)  (  c1)(1  )
2(1  (1  )2) : (9)
Substituting these into rm 1's prot and domestic welfare functions, we obtain
FQ1 =
(  c1   (  c0))2
4(1  (1  )2) ; (10)
SWFQ =
H1
8(1  (1  )2)2 ; (11)
where the Appendix reports H1 and other constants.
Next, we discuss price competition. The direct demand for good i is given by
qi =
     pi + pj
(1  2) (i = 1; 2; i 6= j): (12)
After observing p1, the follower, rm 0, chooses p0. The rst-order condition is
@SW
@p0
=
c0   p0 + (1  )(p1   c1)
(1  ) = 0: (13)
From (13), we obtain the following reaction function of rm 0.
R0(p1) = c0 + (1  )(p1   c1): (14)
The leader, rm 1, maximizes its prot, 1(p1; R0(p1)). The rst-order condition of rm 1 is
(1  ) + c0 + (1  2(1  )2)c1   2(1  2 + 2)p1
(1  ) = 0: (15)
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Let the superscript \FP" denote the equilibrium outcome of this game, where \P" indicates price
competition. From (15), we obtain
pFP1 =
(1  ) + c0 + (1  2(1  )2)c1
2  2(1  )2 : (16)
Substituting it into (14), we obtain
pFP0 =
(1  )((1  )  c1) + (2  (1  )2)c0
2  2(1  )2 : (17)
Substituting these into rm 1's prot and domestic welfare functions, we obtain
FP1 =
((1  ) + c0   c1)2
4(1  2)(1  (1  )2) ; (18)
SWFP =
H2
8(1  2)(1  (1  )2)2 : (19)
We now compare the welfare and prot levels in these two games. We address how the leader{follower
structure aects the prot and welfare rankings in the mixed duopoly.
Proposition 1 Consider Stackelberg competition with private leadership. (i) Quantity competition yields
greater welfare than price competition if and only if the foreign ownership share in the private rm is
below the threshold value () 2 (0; 1). (ii) The private rm obtains greater prot under price competition
than under quantity competition regardless of .
Proof. Comparing social surplus under price competition and quantity competition, we obtain
SWFQ   SWFP = (  c1   (  c0))
22
 
1  22 + 2  2   1  2
8(1  )(1 + ) (1  (1  )2)2 :
This shows that SWFQ > SWFP holds if 0 <  < () =
p
(1  2)  (1  2)

=2. Similarly,
straightforward computations show
FP1   FQ1 =
2(  c1   (  c0))2
4(1  2)(1  (1  )2) > 0: 
As Haraguchi and Matsumura (2014) showed, price competition yields greater welfare and prot
for the private rm than quantity competition, regardless of the nationality of the private rm in the
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simultaneous-move game. Proposition 1(i) is in sharp contrast to the result of the simultaneous-move
game, whereas Proposition 1(ii) suggests that the prot ranking is in accordance with it. We explain
the intuition behind Proposition 1(i).
As the Stackelberg leader, the private rm has an incentive to make the public rm less aggressive
(choosing a smaller output or higher price) to increase its prot. Thus, under quantity (price) compe-
tition, the private rm chooses a larger output (higher price) than in the simultaneous-move case. The
larger output (higher price) of the private rm improves (reduces) the consumer surplus. Therefore,
welfare is greater under quantity competition than under price competition when the private rm is
domestic.
However, when  is positive, the private rm's higher output increases its prot, thus increasing the
outow to foreign investors, which cancels the welfare gain under quantity competition. This eect is
more signicant when the foreign ownership share in the private rm is larger. Therefore, the welfare
ranking is again reversed in this case.
4 Public leadership: Public rm as the Stackelberg leader
In this section, we analyze a Stackelberg model in which rm 0 (1) is the leader (follower). First, we
discuss quantity competition. Firm 1 maximizes its own prot given q0. The rst-order condition for
rm 1 is given by
1
@q1
=   c1   (q0 + 2q1) = 0: (20)
From (20), we obtain the following reaction function of rm 1:
R1(q0) =
  c1   q0
2
: (21)
Considering the reaction function R1(q0), rm 0 maximizes domestic welfare. The rst-order condition
for rm 0 is
1
4
(4(  c0)  (  c1)(3  2)   (4  32 + 22)q0) = 0: (22)
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Let the superscript \LQ" denote the equilibrium outcome of this game, where \L" indicates public
leadership (private followership) and \Q" represents quantity competition. From (22), we obtain
qLQ0 =
4(  c0)  (  c1)(3  2)
(4  (3  2)2) : (23)
Substituting it into (21), we obtain
qLQ1 =
2((  c1)  (  c0))
(4  (3  2)2) : (24)
Substituting these equilibrium quantities into rm 1's prot and domestic welfare, we obtain
LQ1 =
4((  c1)  (  c0))2
(4  (3  2)2)2 ; (25)
SWLQ =
H3
2 (4  (3  2)2) : (26)
Next, we discuss price competition. After observing p0, rm 1 chooses p1 to maximize its own prot.
The rst-order condition for rm 1 is
@1
@p1
=
(1  ) + c1 + p0   2p1
(1  2) = 0: (27)
From (27), we obtain the following reaction function for rm 1:
R1(p0) =
(1  ) + c1 + p0
2
: (28)
The leader, rm 0, maximizes domestic welfare with respect to p0. The rst-order condition for rm 0 is
(1  2)((1  )  c1) + 2c0
 
2  2  (22   32 + 4)p0
 (2   1) = 0: (29)
Let the superscript \LP" denote the equilibrium outcome of this game. From (29), we obtain
pLP0 =
(1  2)((1  )  c1) + 2c0
 
2  2
4  2(3  2) : (30)
Substituting it into (28), we obtain
pLP1 =
 
2  2 ((1  ) + c0) + 2c1  1  (1  )2
4  2(3  2) : (31)
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Substituting these equilibrium prices into rm 1's prot and domestic welfare, we obtain
LP1 =
 
2  22 ((  c1)  (  c0))2
(1  2) (4  (3  2)2)2 ; (32)
SWLP =
H4
2(1  2) (4  (3  2)2) : (33)
We now compare welfare and prot levels in these two games.
Proposition 2 Consider Stackelberg competition with public leadership. (i) Price competition yields
greater welfare than quantity competition. (ii) The private rm obtains greater prot under price com-
petition than under quantity competition.
Proof. Comparing the social surplus and private prot under both types of competition, we obtain
SWLP   SWLQ = 
2((  c1)  (  c0))2
2(1  2) (4  (3  2)2) > 0
LP1   LQ1 =
4((  c1)  (  c0))2
(1  2) (4  (3  2)2)2 > 0: 
As the Stackelberg leader, the public rm has an incentive to make the private rm more aggressive
(choosing larger output or lower price) to improve welfare. Thus, under quantity (price) competition,
the public rm chooses a smaller output (lower price) than in the simultaneous-move case. Therefore,
the private rm's prot is larger (smaller) than in the simultaneous-move case under quantity (price)
competition. Thus, the public rm's strategic behavior as the Stackelberg leader reduces the prot
advantage of price competition. Nevertheless, prot ranking is not reversed. A public rm's lower price
reduces the resulting output of the private rm, and thereby reduces welfare. Therefore, the public rm
still sets a higher price under price competition than the resulting price under quantity competition, and
price competition thus yields a larger prot for the private rm.
We now explain the intuition of Proposition 2(i). Under quantity competition, the private rm's
larger output improves welfare, while (given the output of the private rm) a smaller output from the
public rm reduces welfare. Under price competition, the lower prices of both the public and private rms
11
improve welfare. Thus, the welfare-improving eect of the public rm's strategic behavior is stronger
under price competition than under quantity competition. Therefore, the welfare ranking is not reversed.
5 Nonnegative prot constraint
In the previous sections, we allowed the public rm to choose the price or quantity without any constraint.
As a result, the public rm's equilibrium prot can be negative. However, we often observe that the
nonnegative prot constraint is imposed on public rms. The equilibrium prot is positive under private
leadership if rms face price competition, and this constraint is not binding. By contrast, the equilibrium
prot of the public rm is negative under private leadership when rms face quantity competition and
 > 0. In addition, the equilibrium prot of the public rm is negative under public leadership if  > 1=2,
regardless of whether the rms face price or quantity competition.
We nd that under public leadership, introducing the nonnegative constraint in the public rm's
prot aects neither the prot nor welfare ranking between price and quantity competition (i.e., welfare is
greater and the private rm's prot is larger under price competition than under quantity competition).11
However, under private leadership, introducing this constraint increases the private rm's prot and
improves welfare when rms face quantity competition, whereas both remain unchanged when rms face
price competition. Therefore, imposing the nonnegative constraint on the public rm's prot strengthens
the prot and welfare advantage of quantity competition.
We now proceed to the formal analysis of private leadership. First, we consider quantity competi-
tion. Given q1, rm 0 chooses its quantity to maximize social welfare subject to the nonnegative prot
condition:
max
q0
SW subject to 0  0:
11The formal proof is available upon request from the authors.
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We then obtain the following reaction function:
R0(q1) =
8>><>>:
  c0   q1

if 0  q1  q1 :=
  c0
(1  ) (34)
(  c0   (1  )q1

if q1 < q1. (35)
(34) is derived from the zero prot condition (i.e., the constraint is binding) and (35) is derived from
the rst-order condition without constraint ( i.e., the constraint is not binding). Intuitively, when rm 1
chooses a smaller output (q1  q1), rm 0 produces a larger output to improve social welfare, resulting
in a negative prot if there is no constraint. However, the nonnegative prot constraint applies to rm
0 and cannot choose the optimal output. Therefore, the constraint determines rm 0's output.
Firm 1 maximizes its prot, 1(q1; R0(q1)), with respect to q1. We obtain
q1   qFQ1 =
(  c0)(2  2(1  ))  (  c1)(1  )
2(1  (1  )2)(1  ) > 0:
Because 1(q1; R0(q1)) is concave with respect to q1 in the private leadership game without the non-
negative prot constraint, it is decreasing in q1 for q1  qFQ1 . This implies that q1  q1 in equilibrium
because qFQ1 < q1: Under the nonnegative prot condition, rm 0's reaction function is the former case.
Thus, the rst-order condition of rm 1 is
(  c1)  (  c0)  2q1(1  2) = 0: (36)
Let the superscript \FQcon" denote the equilibrium outcome in the private leadership quantity
competition game with the nonnegative prot constraint. From (36), we obtain
qFQcon1 =
  c1   (  c0)
2(1  2) : (37)
Substituting this into (34), we obtain
qFQcon0 =
(  c0)(2  2)  (  c1)
2(1  2) : (38)
Substituting these equilibrium quantities into rm 1's prot and domestic welfare functions, we obtain
FQcon1 =
((  c1)  (  c0))2
4(1  2) (39)
SWFQcon =
H5
8(1  2) : (40)
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Next, we consider price competition. From (14), we obtain R0(p1)  c0 as long as p1  c1. Because
rm 1 never chooses p1 < c1, rm 0's prot is never negative, even without the nonnegative prot
constraint, and this constraint is therefore not binding. Comparing social surplus and the private rm's
prot under both types of competition with the nonnegative prot condition, we obtain
SWFQcon   SWFP = 
2
 
1  223    1  32 2   2 ((  c1)  (  c0))2
8(1  )(1 + ) (1  (1  )2)2 > 0 (41)
FP1   FQcon1 =
((  c1)  (  c0))22(1  )
4(1  2)(1  (1  )2) > 0: (42)
These discussions lead to the following result.
Proposition 3 Suppose that rm 0 cannot choose an output that yields a negative prot. Under private
leadership with quantity competition, the private rm's prot is smaller and welfare is greater when rms
face quantity competition than when rms face price competition, regardless of .
As we stated above, under private leadership, the public rm's prot is negative when rms face
quantity competition. Imposing the nonnegative prot constraint makes the public rm less aggressive.
Expecting this less aggressive behavior, the private leader expands its output, resulting in a welfare
gain. Under quantity competition, the private rm's prot increases due to the less competitive situation
brought about by the nonnegative prot constraint. The prot ranking, however, does not change.
Proposition 3 has an important policy implication. Under private leadership, it is benecial to impose
a nonnegative prot constraint on the public rm if rms face quantity competition. However, when
rms face price competition, this constraint does not matter.
6 Endogenous competition structure
In this section, we endogenize the choice of strategic variable (either price or quantity contract). We
consider the following timeline:
(a) First, both the leader and the follower choose a price or quantity contract. After observing the
price-quantity choices, they face Stackelberg competition.
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(b) First, the leader chooses either the price or quantity level. After observing the leader, the follower
chooses price or quantity.
In other words, the roles of the leader and the follower are given exogenously but rms can choose a
price or quantity contract.
In both scenarios, given the leader's price or quantity, the follower's demand function that maps
the follower's price to its quantity is xed. Therefore, the follower's choice of price and quantity does
not aect the equilibrium outcome and thus the follower is indierent between the two. However, the
leader's choice signicantly aects the equilibrium outcome. As Singh and Vives (1984) showed, the
rm's demand elasticity is higher when the rival chooses the price than when it chooses the quantity. In
our context, the follower's demand is more sensitive to its price when the leader chooses the price. We
explain the intuition. Given the leader's price, a reduction in the follower's price reduces the leader's
output; by denition, the price remains unchanged. Given the leader's quantity, a reduction in the
follower's price reduces the leader's price; by denition, the output remains unchanged. Therefore, given
the leader's quantity, the follower's price reduction automatically reduces the rival's price and thus, the
follower's demand is less sensitive to its own price given the leader's quantity.
If the leader chooses the price (quantity), price (quantity) competition occurs because, as we discuss
above, the follower's choice between the price and quantity does not matter. We showed earlier that price
competition always provides the private rm with a higher prot. Therefore, under private leadership,
the private rm chooses the price, resulting in price competition. We also showed that price competi-
tion yields greater welfare under public leadership. Therefore, under public leadership, the public rm
chooses the price, resulting in price competition. Under these conditions, price competition occurs if
we endogenize the competition structure, regardless of public or private leadership. This suggests that
under private leadership, it is possible that the equilibrium competition structure will be inecient.12
12In the simultaneous-move games, price competition yields greater welfare in both private and mixed duopolies, and
the equilibrium outcome is price competition. In this sense, the outcome is ecient in mixed duopolies. Our result clearly
shows that this is not true under private leadership.
15
7 Concluding remarks
In this study, we revisit the welfare and prot comparison between price and quantity competition in
mixed duopolies. We consider sequential-move games and nd that welfare can reverse when the public
rm is the follower, while price competition is always better for welfare when the public rm is the
leader. In addition, we nd that foreign ownership share plays an important role when the public rm is
the follower. Finally, we endogenize the competition structure and nd that price competition appears
regardless of whether the public or private rm is the leader. We do not consider any government
strategic policies such as tax-subsidies, privatization, and trade policies in this study. These policies
are intensively discussed in the literature and incorporating these into our analysis remains for future
research.13
13For recent developments in studies of these policies in mixed markets, see Cato and Matsumura (2015) and the works
cited therein.
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